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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to joint devia-
tions. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria were deﬁned in the literature.
One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which coalitions can
plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players re-
ceive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we prove that if deviating
coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an ex-ante strong cor-
related equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets
of strong correlated equilibria.
1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to the play, inﬂuences the set
of self-enforcing outcomes of a non-cooperative game. The communication
allows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strat-
egy proﬁle as a feasible non-biding agreement. For such an agreement to be
self-enforcing, it has to be stable against reasonable coalitional deviations.
Two notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong
correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional devi-
ations, and a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable
against self-enforcing coalitional deviations (a deviation is self-enforcing if no
sub-coalition has further self-enforcing and improving deviation).
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Each notion has a few alternative deﬁnitions. One major diﬀerence among
them, is the stage in which coalitions can plan a deviation from a correlated
agreement. Assume that the correlated agreement is implemented by a me-
diator who privately recommends each player what to play. The deﬁnitions
in Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Moreno & Wooders (1996), and Ray (1996)
are ex-ante deﬁnitions: In their framework, players may plan deviations be-
fore receiving recommendations, and no further communication is possible af-
ter recommendations are issued. The deﬁnitions in Einy & Peleg (1995), Ray
(1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007) are ex-post 2 deﬁnitions: In their framework,
players may plan deviations only after receiving recommendations.
However, in some frameworks coalitions can plan deviations at all stages. One
example for such framework is an extended game with cheap-talk : pre-play,
unmediated, non-biding, non-veriﬁable communication among the players. 3 In
such a framework, the players can mimic a mediator, and implement a large
set of strong correlated equilibria as a strong Nash equilibria (Aumann, 1959)
in the extended game (Heller, 2008). 4 A coalition can plan a deviation in the
early phases of the cheap-talk when no player has received his recommendation
yet (ex-ante stage), in the late phases when all players have received their
recommendations (ex-post stage), or in an intermediate stage when some of
the players know their recommendations.
A natural question is whether any of the existing notions is appropriate to
such frameworks, or whether new deﬁnitions are needed. In this paper we
prove that the existing ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (a` la Moreno
& Wooders) is resistant to deviations at all stages. The proof is based on
three assumptions about the communication framework (which hold in the
cheap-talk framework):
(1) A deviating coalition can use new correlating devices (play a joint corre-
lated deviation).
(2) When a coalition decides to deviate, that decision is common knowledge
among its members.
(3) The players share a common prior about the possible states of the world
in an incomplete information model a` la Aumann (1987).
An immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria
2 Referred to as interim in some of the referred papers.
3 For a good nontechnical introduction to some of the main issues of cheap-talk, see
the survey of Farrel & Rabin (1996).
4 The implementation presented in Heller (2008) is only as a bn/2c-strong correlated
equilibrium (an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less
than n/2 players). If one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and
one-way functions exist, then the implementation can be as a strong correlated
equilibrium (as discussed in Lepinski et al., 2004 and Abraham et al., 2006).
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is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria, as deﬁned in the
literature referred above (as described in ﬁgure 1 in page 8).
One could hope that similar results might be obtained for the coalition-
proof notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that the existing ex-ante
coalition-proof notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which coalitions can
plan deviations at all stages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model and the main
result. The main result is demonstrated in Section 3, and proven in Section 4.
We discuss the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where N
is the ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of players with a size n = |N |, and for each
i ∈ N , Ai is player i 's ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of actions (or pure strategies),
and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ) function, a real-valued function on A =∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-linear extension of ui to ∆ (A) is is still denoted by ui. A
member of ∆ (A) is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-
empty member of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted
as i. Given a coalition S, and let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated)
S -strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS)
to be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
2.2 An Intuitive Description of Our Framework
Assume that the players of a game G (which will be played tomorrow), have
agreed to play a correlated strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A). The players implement
q with the assistance of a mediator who chooses the action proﬁle a ∈ A with
probability q(a). Throughout the day, the mediator calls each player i and pri-
vately gives him his recommendation: ai ∈ Ai. The players do not necessarily
know the order in which the mediator calls the players, or which players have
already been called. During the day, the players can communicate, share in-
formation about their recommendations, and plan coalitional deviations from
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the agreement. If all the members of a coalition agree to use a deviation (each,
with his own posterior information, believes that the deviation is proﬁtable),
then it is implemented with the assistance of a deviating device - a new media-
tor who receives (at the end of the day) the recommendations of the deviating
players, and gives each of them a new recommendation. In the next day, each
player simultaneously chooses an action in G. The proﬁle q is an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium, if for every calling order and every stage, there
is no coalition with a proﬁtable deviation, as will be formally deﬁned in the
next Subsection.
2.3 All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
A deviating device implements a mapping from AS (the original recommenda-
tions the players in S have received) to ∆(AS) (the set of correlated S -strategy
proﬁles).
Deﬁnition 1 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , a deviating device is a function
dS : AS → ∆(AS).
When the members of S consider to implement a deviating device, they are in
a situation of incomplete information: each player may have the private value
of his recommendation, and may have additional private information acquired
when communicating with the other deviating players. We describe the infor-
mation structure during the communication among the deviating players in a
model based on Aumann (1976, 1987).
Deﬁnition 2 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , an information structure of S is a
5-tuple: (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) where:
(1) The 3-tuple (Ω, B, µ) is a probability space.
(2) The (F i)i∈S are partitions of Ω whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common
reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists of non-null events.
(3) The (ai)i∈N are random variables in (Ω, B, µ), where a
i : Ω→ Ai.
We interpret (Ω,B) as the space of states of the world for the players of S (at
some stage of their consideration whether to use a deviating device), µ as the
common prior (for the states of the world) for all the players in S, and F i as
the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true state of the world is
ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of F i that contains
ω. We interpret the random variable ai(ω) as the recommendation of player i
(from the original agreement) in the state ω.
Remark 3 The state of the world ω ∈ Ω includes a full description of the
recommendation proﬁle, the information each deviating player has acquired
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while communicating with the other deviating players, and the beliefs each
of the deviating players has about the information and beliefs of the others.
We assume that all the players share a common prior about the states of the
world. The justiﬁcation of this assumption is discussed in Aumann (1987).
Given a non-null event E ∈ B, let aS(E) ∈ ∆(AS) be a random variable with
the posterior distribution of aS(ω) conditioned on that ω ∈ E.
The information structure of the players must be consistent with the frame-
work:
(1) The prior distribution of aS(Ω) is equal to the agreement's distribution.
(2) The deviating players have no information about the recommendations
of the non-deviating players, except the information that is induced by
their information about their recommendations.
We formalize those requirements in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A) and a coalition S ⊆ N , we say
that an information structure (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈S) is a consistent infor-
mation structure (of S) if the following conditions hold:
(1) ∀bS ∈ AS, Pr(aS(Ω) = bS) = q(bS)
(2) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀b ∈ A,
Pr
(
aN (F i(ω)) = b
)
= Pr
(
aS (F i(ω)) = bS
)
· q(b−S | bS)
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviating de-
vice is proﬁtable to him, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ (given
his information about the distribution of (ai)i∈S ) when playing the original
agreement and when implementing the deviating device. A player agrees to im-
plement a deviating device only if the latter conditional expectation is larger.
We now formally deﬁne the conditional expected payoﬀs of each player in each
state of the world ω, when following the agreement and when implementing a
deviating device.
Deﬁnition 5 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S ⊆ N , a player i ∈
S, a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS), and a consistent information structure
(Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈S), let the conditional expected payoﬀs of player i in
ω ∈ Ω (given his information in ω and the assumption that the players in −S
follow the agreement q) be:
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players in S follow q :
uif (ω) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
F i(ω)
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players of S deviate (by imple-
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menting dS) :
uid(ω) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
F i(ω)
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) ∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS)·ui(cS, b−S)
If the players in S decide to implement a deviating device in some state ω ∈ Ω,
then it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player expects to earn more from
the deviation (conditioned on his information). We now present the formal
deﬁnition of common knowledge (Aumann, 1976):
Deﬁnition 6 Given a coalition S ⊆ N , an information structure (Ω,B, µ,
(F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) and a state ω ∈ Ω, an event E ∈ B is common knowledge at
ω if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i that contains ω.
We deﬁne a proﬁtable deviating device, as a deviating device that in some
consistent information structure, it is common knowledge in some state of
the world, that each player expects to earn more if the deviating device is
implemented.
Deﬁnition 7 Given a strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) and a coalition S ⊆ N , we
say that a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS) is proﬁtable (for S ), if there
exists a consistent information structure (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) and a state
ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω).
We can now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviating device.
Deﬁnition 8 A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage strong correlated
equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviating device.
2.4 Ex-ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a prof-
itable deviating device at the ex-ante stage (when the players have not received
their recommends yet). It would be useful (following Moreno & Wooders,
1996), to deﬁne ﬁrst the notion of a feasible ex-ante deviation for a coalition
S, as a correlated strategy proﬁle p ∈ A that the coalition can induce with the
use of a deviating device at the ex-ante stage.
Deﬁnition 9 Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle and let S ⊆ N be a coalition.
We say that p ∈ ∆(A) is a feasible ex-ante deviation by a coalition S from
q if there is a deviating device dS : AS → ∆(AS) such that for all a ∈ A we
have p(a) =
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS, a−S) · dS(aS|bS). In that case we say that p is induced
from q by the deviating device dS. Let D(q, S) ⊆ ∆(A) denote the set of all
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feasible ax-ante deviations by a coalition S from q.
An ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle from which no
coalition has a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation.
Deﬁnition 10 A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a feasible deviation p ∈ D(q, S), such
that for each i ⊆ S, we have ui(p) > ui(q).
2.5 Main Result
It is straightforward to see that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium
is also an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, as it is possible to choose a
trivial consistent information structure, in which: ∀i, F i = Ω. Our main result
proves that the converse is also true, and thus the two sets of equilibria are
equal.
Theorem 11 A correlated proﬁle q ∈ 4(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
2.6 Relations With Other Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
Other notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in
Ray (1996) and Milgrom & Roberts (1996). In the framework of Ray, deviating
coalitions are not allowed to construct new correlating devices, and are limited
to use only an uncorrelated deviating device - a function dS : AS → ∏
i∈S
∆(Ai). 5
In the framework of Milgrom & Roberts only some of the coalitions can com-
municate and coordinate deviations. In both cases the sets of feasible coali-
tional deviations is included in our set of deviations, and thus our set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria is included in the sets of ex-ante correlated equi-
libria a` la Ray and a` la Milgrom & Roberts.
An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle which is resistant to de-
viating devices at the ex-post stage (when each player knows his recommen-
dation, i.e., ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃bi ∈ Ai s.t. Pr (ai (F i(ω)) = bi) = 1). Diﬀerent
notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria are presented in Einy & Peleg
(1995), Ray (1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007). In the framework of Einy &
5 In Ray's setup, the original correlating device can also send an indirect signal to
each player (which may hold more information than the recommendation itself). In
that case, the uncorrelated deviating device is a function from the set of S -part of
the signals to the set of uncorrelated S -strategy proﬁles.
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Peleg, a deviating coalition can only use deviating devices that improve the
conditional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation
proﬁles. 6 In the framework of Ray, a deviating coalition S can only use pure
deviating devices - dS : AS → AS. In the framework of Bloch & Dutta, a
deviating coalition S can only use deviating devices that are implemented if
and only if the recommendation proﬁle aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS
which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviating device.
(2) If aS /∈ ES, then at least one player looses from implementing the devia-
tion device (by falsely claiming that aS ∈ ES).
It can be shown that those conditions imply that there exists a consistent
information structure of S and a state in which it is common knowledge that
aS(ω) ∈ ES and that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). Thus our set of ex-post strong
correlated equilibria is included in the sets of ex-post correlated equilibria as
deﬁned in any of those papers.
The inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equi-
libria is described in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1. Inclusion Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilib-
ria
Examples for the diﬀerent notions can be found in Moreno & Wooders (1996):
• An ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium in a 3-player matching pennies
(which is also an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium due to our main
6 In our formulation, it is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω) in
every ω ∈ Ω, and not only in every ω ∈ Fmeet(ω0) .
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result), which is the only reasonable outcome of the game with pre-play
communication (as experimentally demonstrated in Moreno & Wooders,
1998).
• An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium in a 2-player chicken game, which
is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium in
a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviating device that is considered by the grand
coalition at some intermediate stage. At ﬁrst look, one may think that this
deviating device is proﬁtable to all the players (conditioned on their posterior
information at that stage), but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is
not true. The analysis in this example gives the intuition of the formal proof
of the general case in the following Section.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1
b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
c2
b1 b2 b3
a1 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
c3
b1 b2 b3
a1 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
Let q be the following proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium:
• No single player has a unilateral deviation (q is a correlated equilibrium).
• No coalition of two players (say 1,2) has a proﬁtable deviation (their un-
certainty about the recommendation of player 3 prevents them from being
able to earn together more than 20 by a joint deviation).
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider an intermediate stage in which player 1 has received a rec-
ommendation a1, player 2 has received a recommendation a2, player 3 has
not received his recommendation yet. Each player does not know whether the
other players have received their recommendations. At ﬁrst look, the imple-
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mentation of the deviating device dS(·) = (a3, b3, c3) , which gives a payoﬀ of
(7, 11, 12), may look proﬁtable for all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommendation (a1), player 1 has an expected payoﬀ
of 62
3
, and thus dS is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2 as well.
• Player 3 does not know his recommendation. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ is
10, and he would earn a payoﬀ of 12 by implementing dS.
However, a more thorough analysis of player 3's information, reveals that dS
is unproﬁtable for him. Player 1 can only earn from dS (which gives him a
payoﬀ of 7) if he has received a recommendation a2. Thus, if player 1 agrees
to implement dS, then it is common knowledge that he has received a1. The
expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3, conditioned on that player 2 has received a1,
is 112
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to implement dS(with a payoﬀ of 11), then he
must have more information: that his recommendation is a2. Therefore player
3 knows that the if the other players agree to implement dS, then their part
of the recommendation proﬁle is(a1, a2). Conditioned on that, his expected
payoﬀ is 15, and thus dS is unproﬁtable for him.
4 A Proof of the Main Result
In this Section we prove our main result: (theorem 11) - A correlated proﬁle
q ∈ 4(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if and only if it is an
all-stage strong correlated equilibrium. As discussed earlier, one direction is
straightforward, and we have to prove only the other direction:
Theorem 12 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
In other words: if a proﬁtable deviating device from an agreement q ∈ 4(A)
exists, then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
The theorem immediately follows from the following two propositions:
(1) Proposition 14: If an agreement q is not an all-stage strong correlated
equilibrium, then there exists a similar agreement q˜ that is not an ex-
ante strong correlated equilibrium. The similarity is in the sense that q˜
is absolute continues w.r.t. q when restricted to AS, and equal to q when
restricted to A−S and conditioned on AS (as formally deﬁned below).
(2) Proposition 15: If such a similar agreement q˜ is not an ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium, then q itself is not an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium.
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We now present an auxiliary deﬁnition (which will be used in the proof of
proposition 14) for the conditional expected payoﬀs of each player given the
information that ω ∈ E.
Deﬁnition 13 Given an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S ⊆ N , a deviating
device dS : AS → ∆(AS), a consistent information structure (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S ,
(ai)i∈S), and a non-null event E ∈ B, let
((
u˜if (E)
)
i∈S , (u˜
i
d(E))i∈S
)
denote the
conditional expected payoﬀs given the information that the state of the world
is in E (and given that the players in −S follow the agreement q):
• The conditional expected payoﬀ of each player i when the players in S follow
the agreement q (given ω ∈ E):
u˜if (E) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS (E) = bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the players of S deviate by imple-
menting dS (given ω ∈ E):
u˜id(E) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS (E) = bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) ∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS)·ui(cS, b−S)
Observe the diﬀerence between deﬁnition 5 and deﬁnition 13:
• In deﬁnition 5 uif (ω) and uid(ω) describe the conditional utility of player
i (in the state of the world ω ∈ Ω) in the perspective of player i, who is
informed in ω, that the state of the world in in F i(ω).
• In deﬁnition 13 u˜if (E) and u˜id(E) describe the conditional utility of player i
in the perspective of an outside observer, who is informed that the state of
the world is in E.
Proposition 14 Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle (the agreement) that is
not an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium. Then there exists a strategy
proﬁle q˜ ∈ ∆(A) that satisﬁes the following conditions:
(1) q˜|S is absolute continues with respect to q|S :
∀bS ∈ AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
(2) Conditioned on S -part of the recommendations: q˜|−S = q|−S:
∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q(b−S | bS)
(3) q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
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PROOF. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition, let dS : AS → ∆(AS) be a deviating
device, let (Ω,B, µ, (F i)i∈S , (ai)i∈N) be a consistent information structure, and
let ω0 ∈ Ω be a state, such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) >
uif (ω), i.e., F
meet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. Let i ∈ S be a deviating player.
Write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) =
⋃
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint members of F i.
Since uid(ω) > u
i
f (ω) throughout F
meet, then ∀j, u˜id(F ij ) > u˜if (F ij ). Observe
that if E1, E2 ∈ B are two disjoint non-null events then: u˜if (E1
⋃
E2) = (µ(E1)·
u˜if (E1)+µ(E2)·u˜if (E2))/µ(E1+E2) and u˜id(E1
⋃
E2) = (µ(E1)·u˜id(E1)+µ(E2)·
u˜id(E2))/µ(E1 +E2). Thus, it follows that u˜
i
d(F
meet) > u˜if (F
meet). This is true
for every player, thus ∀i∈S u˜id(Fmeet) > u˜if (Fmeet).
Let q˜ be the following strategy proﬁle: ∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b) = q˜(bS, b−S) =
Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
· q(b−S | bS). We show that the three conditions are sat-
isﬁed:
(1)
∀bS ∈AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ Pr
(
aS(Ω) = bS
)
= 0
⇒ Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
= 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
(2)
∀bS ∈AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q˜(b
−S, bS)
q˜(bS)
=
Pr
(
aS(Fmeet) = bS
)
· q(b−S | bS)
Pr (aS(Fmeet) = bS)
= q(b−S | bS)
(3) We have to show that q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
Observe that:
u˜if (F
meet) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
Fmeet
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS) · ui(bS, b−S)
=
∑
b∈A
q˜(b) · ui(b) = ui(q˜)
let p˜ be the ex-ante feasible deviation that is induced from q˜ by the
deviating device dS.
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u˜id(F
meet) =
∑
bS∈AS
Pr
(
aS
(
Fmeet
)
= bS
) ∑
b−S∈A−S
q(b−S | bS)
∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS) · ui(cS, b−S)
=
∑
b∈A
q˜(b)
∑
cS∈AS
dS(cS | bS) · ui(cS, b−S) = ui(p˜)
This implies that: ∀i ∈ S, u˜id(Fmeet) > u˜if (Fmeet)⇒ ui(p˜) > ui(q˜), thus q˜
is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. QED.
We ﬁnish our main result by the following proposition: If a similar agreement
q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, then q itself is not an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Let q, q˜ ∈ ∆(A) be two strategy proﬁles that satisfy the
following conditions:
(1) q˜|S is absolute continues with respect to q|S :
∀bS ∈ AS, q(bS) = 0⇒ q˜(bS) = 0
(2) Conditioned on S -part of the recommendations: q˜|−S = q|−S:
∀bS ∈ AS, ∀b−S ∈ A−S, q˜(b−S | bS) = q(b−S | bS)
(3) q˜ is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
Then q is not an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
PROOF. For simplicity of notation, we assume w.l.o.g. that ∀aS ∈ AS q(aS) >
0 (because q(aS) = 0 ⇒ q˜(aS) = 0, and those impossible action proﬁles
do not aﬀect any of the utilities functions and can be omitted). Let d˜S :
AS → ∆(AS) be a deviating device, such that ∀i, ui(p˜) > ui(q˜), where
p˜ ∈ ∆(A) is the feasible deviation induced from d˜S. Let m = max |
i∈S
Ai| and
let ε = 1
m
min
aS∈AS , q˜(aS)>0
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
. We begin by constructing an auxiliary deviating
device d˜Sε : A
S → ∆(AS):
d˜Sε (a
S|bS) =

εd˜S(aS|bS) aS 6= bS
1− ∑
cS 6=bS
εd˜S(cS|bS) aS = bS
In the deviating device d˜Sε the players of S follow the agreement with proba-
bility 1− ε, and deviate according to d˜S with probability ε. Let p˜ε ∈ D(q˜, S)
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be the feasible ex-ante deviation of S from q˜ that is induced by d˜Sε . Observe
that p˜ε is a proﬁtable deviation for all the players in S : ∀i∈S, ui(q˜) < ui(p˜ε)
(because ui(q˜)− ui(p˜ε) = ε (ui(q˜)− ui(p˜)) < 0).
We continue by constructing the following deviating device (of S ) dS : AS →
∆(AS):
dS(aS|bS) =

q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) aS 6= bS
1− ∑
cS 6=bS
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (cS|bS) aS = bS
.
We ﬁrst show that dS is a valid deviating device by validating that ∀aS, bS ∈
AS 0 ≤ dS(aS|bS) ≤ 1.
∀aS 6= bS, dS(aS|bS) = q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) =
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· εd˜S(aS|bS)
=
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· 1
m
(
min
aS∈AS , q˜(aS)>0
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
)
· d˜S(aS|bS)
≤ q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· 1
m
· q(b
S)
q˜(bS)
· d˜S(aS|bS) = 1
m
· d˜S(aS|bS) ≤ 1
And using the inequality (which is a part of the last chain of inequalities):
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) ≤
1
m
· d˜S(aS|bS)
We get:
dS(aS|aS) = 1− ∑
aS 6=bS
q˜(bS)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) ≥ 1−
1
m
∑
aS 6=bS
d˜S(aS|bS) ≥ 1− 1 ≥ 0.
Let p ∈ D(q, S) be the feasible ex-ante deviation that is induced by dS. We
ﬁnish the proof by showing that p is a proﬁtable deviation from q : i.e.,
∀i ∈ S, ui(q) < ui(p)), and thus q is not an ex-ante strong correlated equi-
librium. Let i ∈ S. We show: ui(p) − ui(q) ?= ui(p˜ε) − ui(q˜) > 0. Observe
that:
ui(q) =
∑
a∈A
q(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
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ui(p) =
∑
a∈A
p(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
Therefore:
ui(p)− ui(q) = ∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q(aS) ·
(
1− dS(aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS) ·
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS) · ui(a)
Last equality is due to the following two equalities:
∀aS 6= bS, q(bS) · dS(aS|bS) = q(bS) q˜(b
S)
q(bS)
· d˜Sε (aS|bS) = q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
q(aS) ·
(
1− dS(aS|aS)
)
= q(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
q˜(aS)
q(aS)
· d˜Sε (cS|aS)
= q˜(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
q(aS)
q˜(aS)
· q˜(a
S)
q(aS)
· d˜Sε (cS|aS)
= q˜(aS)
∑
cS 6=aS
d˜Sε (c
S|aS)
= q˜(aS) ·
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
)
We ﬁnish the proof by showing that the last expression is equal to ui(p˜ε)−ui(q˜).
Observe that:
ui(p˜ε) =
∑
a∈A
p˜ε(a) · ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
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ui(q˜) =
∑
a∈A
q˜(a) · ui(a) = ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS) · ui(a)
Therefore:
ui(pε)− ui(q˜) =
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS∈AS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|aS)ui(a)
=
∑
aS∈AS
∑
bS 6=aS
q˜(bS) · d˜Sε (aS|bS)
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−S|bS) · ui(a)
− ∑
aS∈AS
q˜(aS)
(
1− d˜Sε (aS|aS)
) ∑
a−S∈A−S
q(a−s|aS)ui(a)
QED.
5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In the last Section we show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium a`
la Moreno & Wooders is also appropriate to frameworks in which players can
plan deviations at all stages. A natural question is whether a similar result
holds for their notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 7 In this Sec-
tion we show that the answer is negative, by presenting an example (adapted
from Bloch & Dutta, 2007), in which there is an ex-ante coalition-proof cor-
related equilibrium that is not self enforcing agreement in a framework in
which communication is possible at all stages. Table 2 presents the matrix
representation of a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-
proof equilibrium. First, observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium:
7 Recall (Moreno & Wooders, 1996) that an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equi-
librium is a strategy proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and im-
proving ex-ante deviation. An ex-ante deviation is self enforcing, if no proper sub-
coalition has a further self-enforcing and improving deviation.
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no player has a proﬁtable unilateral deviation. Moreno & Wooders (1996) have
proved that in a two-player game, every correlated proﬁle which is not Pareto-
dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium. Our proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we prove that
the proﬁle is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing
that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let
x = q (a1, b1). Observe that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 1 would
have a proﬁtable deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies
q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 2 would have a proﬁtable deviation
(playing a1 when recommended a2). Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that
the recommendation proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4,
and because the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommendation proﬁle
is not in A is at most 3, then the total payoﬀ of q is at most 4.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can communicate and plan deviations also at the
ex-post stage. 8 Assume that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and
player 1 has received a recommendation a2. In that case, he can communicate
with player 1 at the ex-post stage, tell him that he received a2 (and thus if
the players follow the recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2),
and suggest a joint deviation - playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive
to lie (to make a false claim that his recommendation is a2 when it is a1),
then player 2 would believe player 1, and they would both play (a3, b3). This
ex-post deviation is self-enforcing: (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium, and thus no
player has a proﬁtable sub-deviation.
Observe that the same deviation is not selfenforcing in the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviating device that
changes (a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 will have a proﬁtable sub-deviation:
playing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a
deviating device that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 will have a
proﬁtable sub-deviation - playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Concluding Remarks
(1) Bayesian games: Moreno & Wooders (1996) present a notion of ex-ante
strong communication equilibrium in Bayesian games. Our result can be
8 The proﬁle is not an ex-post coalition-proof correlated equilibrium according to
the deﬁnitions of Bloch & Dutta (2007) and Ray (1998). The proﬁle is an ex-post
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium according to the deﬁnition of Einy & Peleg,
due to their requirement that an ex-post deviation would be strictly proﬁtable to
each player given all recommendations he may receive.
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extended to this framework as well, to show that an ex-ante 9 strong
communication equilibrium is also resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) k-strong equilibria: In Heller (2008) an ex-ante notion of k -strong corre-
lated equilibrium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all
coalitional deviations of up to k players. Our result can be directly ex-
tended to this notion as well: an ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium
is resistant to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
(3) Related Literature:
(a) The question of existence of strong and coalition-proof correlated
equilibria is discussed in Moreno & Wooders (1996), Milgrom &
Roberts (1996), Ray (1996), Holzman & Law-Yone (1996), and Bloch
& Dutta (2007).
(b) Applications of strong and coalition-proof equilibria are presented
and discussed in Bernheim & Whinston (1986, 1987), Einy & Peleg
(1996) and Delgado & Moreno (2004).
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